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This paper explores whether psychographic profiling and targeting married with big
data and deployed in digital political campaigns is a form of psychological operations
(“psy-ops”). Informed by studies on deception, coercion, and influence activities
from propaganda, persuasion, policy making, cognitive psychology, information, and
marketing scholarship, this proposition is examined and historically grounded in a
politically important case study: the actions of now defunct political data analytics
and behaviour change company, Cambridge Analytica, in the UK’s 2016 referendum
campaign on leaving the European Union. Based on qualitative analysis of documentation
in the UK and USA from public inquiries, regulatory investigations, legal proceedings, and
investigative journalists, as well as on revelations from digital political campaigners and
Cambridge Analytica itself, this paper assesses the coercive and deceptive nature of
Cambridge Analytica’s psychographic profiling and targeting, concluding that it is a form
of psy-ops. Observing the social unacceptability of such digital campaigning practices
(ascertained from national surveys in the US, UK, and globally), this paper discusses the
adequacy of measures since put in place to eliminate the risk of further psy-ops in digital
political campaigning. It ends by elucidating areas in urgent need of further research.
Keywords: deception, coercion, influence activities, digital political campaign, psychographics, profiling,
targeting, psychological operations
INTRODUCTION
The issue of psychographic profiling and targeting in political campaigning first rose to prominence
with the practices of Cambridge Analytica, a now defunct political data analytics and behaviour
change company. Whistleblowers from Cambridge Analytica claim that the company engaged
in psychological operations (“psy-ops”) in its electoral campaigning efforts across the world
(Cadwalladr, 2018; Kaiser, 2019b; Wylie, 2019). This study theoretically and empirically assesses
this claim. It does so by investigating whether psychographic profiling and targeting married with
big data in election campaigns is a form of “psy-ops”; and by testing this proposition in a politically
important case study—the actions of Cambridge Analytica in the UK’s 2016 “Brexit” Referendum
on leaving the European Union.
Bakir Psy-ops in Digital Political Campaigns
Psychographic research emerged in the 1960s, attempting
to understand consumer (rather than political) behaviour, and
moving beyond standard demographics into areas such as
personality traits, activities, interests, opinions, needs, values,
and attitudes to offer novel insights into large, representative
samples of respondents (Wells, 1975). However, increasingly
across the past decade, psychographic and neuromarketing tools
are combined with data and tracking methods to determine the
emotional impact of advertising campaigns, and how to tailor
persuasive political messages to profiled audiences’ psychological
needs (Chester and Montgomery, 2017; Bakir and McStay, 2018,
2020). “Profiling” is defined in the European General Data
Protection Regulation as: “any form of automated processing
of personal data . . . to analyse or predict aspects concerning
that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation,
health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour,
location or movements’ (Privacy International, 2020). According
to Cambridge Analytica’s Chief Executive Officer (Alexander
Nix), it is the techniques of psychographic targeting married
with big data analysis that enable the marketer to understand the
personality of people being targeted in order to tailor messages.
Nix made this claim when explaining how Cambridge Analytica
used such techniques in Ted Cruz’s 2016 campaign to become
nominated as the Republican US presidential candidate. Nix
claims that big data analytics allows campaigners to know what
sort of persuasive message needs to be delivered, on what issue,
nuanced to what personality types, and to what group of people,
or even individual, before the act of creating that message begins;
and that addressable advertising technology further enables
targeted, individualised adverts (Nix, 2016).
Psy-ops is a subset of “Information Operations” -the latter
being a synonym for “information warfare,” an umbrella term
that encompasses psy-ops, electronic warfare, computer network
operations and deception (Briant, 2015, p. 23). Simpson (1994)
observes that psy-ops has long been used as a tactic of
war or class struggle, as evidenced in military manuals and
communist tracts. He defines psy-ops as explicitly linking mass
communication with “selective application of violence (murder,
sabotage, assassination, insurrection, counterinsurrection, etc.)
as a means of achieving ideological, political, or military goals . . .
through exploitation of a target audience’s cultural-psychological
attributes and its communication system” (Simpson, 1994, p. 11).
Psy-ops, then, has a coercive nature in its application of force
(violence, for Simpson). However, violence is not the only way of
applying coercion: coercion can also take form in the deliberate
limitation of people’s choices by making them feel or behave a
certain way. In this vein, Briant describes psy-ops as propaganda
work designed to induce certain emotions and elicit certain
behaviour in target audiences (Briant, 2015, p. 12–13). Under this
definition, if psychographic profiling and targeting married with
big data becomes coercive (for instance, by modulating people’s
exposure to information in ways that constrain their choices and
behaviour), it would be accurate to describe it as psy-ops.
To better understand and assess the whistleblowers’ claims
on psy-ops, this paper situates Cambridge Analytica’s actions
on psychographic profiling and targeting within studies on
deception, coercion, and influence activities from propaganda,
persuasion, policy making, cognitive psychology, information,
and marketing scholarship. This literature grapples with
the question of when persuasive communication lapses into
propagandistic influence and manipulation; highlights how
political campaigners deploy digital marketing tools that lend
themselves toward deceptive, coercive, influence activities; and
discusses democratic implications. Adopting a case study
methodology, this exposition is followed by an empirical
examination of the coercive and deceptive nature of Cambridge
Analytica’s psychographic profiling and targeting. This is assessed
with reference to the UK’s “Brexit” referendum campaign in 2016
on leaving the European Union (EU).With recourse to published
national surveys in the US, UK, and globally, the paper ends with
a discussion on the social unacceptability of these practices; the
adequacy of measures since put in place to address such practices;
and urgent areas requiring further research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Persuasion vs. Influence
When does persuasive communication lapse into propagandistic
influence and manipulation, and when are such lapses
democratically acceptable? Studies from propaganda and
policy making have grappled with these questions.
The field of propaganda studies offers several integrative
frameworks with criteria for distinguishing ethically and
democratically legitimate persuasive communication from
propaganda. The most enduring framework used is that of
white, grey, and black propaganda that discusses honesty over
message source (whether or not it is disguised) and truthfulness
of message content (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012). However,
Bakir et al. (2019) posit that this framework, in directing
attention toward deception alone, does not capture the full
range of propaganda and therefore does not readily facilitate our
ability to distinguish propaganda from persuasion. Addressing
these deficiencies, Bakir et al. (2019) argue that persuasive
communication, to avoid being propagandistic, should be
guided by the principle of informed consent. This demands
that three requirements be met. Firstly, sufficient information
must be provided to enable informed judgments. Secondly, this
information should be of a non-deceptive nature so that consent
is not achieved on false premises. Thirdly, the process must not
be coerced (such as through threats): rather, consent should
be freely given. In short, in order to ethically persuade (rather
than manipulate) people toward a particular viewpoint, the
persuadee’s decision should be both informed and freely chosen:
each of these is disabled by deception and coercion (Bakir et al.,
2019; also see Chappell, 2017).
Informed and freely chosen decisions are also disabled by
influence activities that aim to change behaviour rather than
attitudes. Influence activities are deployed for military and
governmental purposes. Briant records how the British military
has increasingly emphasised influence activities that combine
propaganda with “deliberate manipulation of the circumstances
or environment in which people act and make decisions”: for
instance, providing job opportunities in a country suffering from
insurgencies, so that people who make bombs simply to earn
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money stop making those bombs (behaviour change) but need
not change their attitude toward the merits of insurgent bomb-
making (Briant, 2015, p. 64). Not confined to the security state,
influence activities, are also found at the heart of the British
government. In the UK, the Behavioural Insight Team (or “nudge
unit”) was created in 2010, and by 2014 it had become a social
purpose limited company (jointly owned by employees, UK
Cabinet Office, and UK innovation charity Nesta). By 2020 its
work spanned 31 countries in its efforts to “generate and apply
behavioural insights to inform policy, improve public services
and deliver results for citizens and society” (The Behavioural
Insights Team, 2020).
Underpinned by insights from behavioural economics and
cognitive psychology, a nudge is: “any aspect of the choice
architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way,
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their
economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention
must be easy and cheap to avoid” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008,
p. 6). Mols et al. (2015, p. 84) reserve the term “nudge” for
interventions that tap into psychological human failings that
lead people to fall back on automatic rather than systematic
information-processing strategies and decision making: for
instance, tapping into people’s propensity to choose options that
demand the least effort, or to conform to prevailing group norms.
An example of nudging is Facebook’s get-out-the-vote button,
first used in the USA in 2008 and in the UK in the 2014 Scottish
referendum, and used repeatedly since in elections and referenda
in these and other countries (Grassegger, 2018). This nudge to
vote (a single message displayed in the user’s Facebook feed on
election day that encouraged the user to vote, provided a link
to find local polling places, showed a clickable button reading
“I Voted,” and showed a counter indicating how many other
Facebook users had reported voting) can be easily disregarded
by Facebook users, but according to Facebook’s own studies, is
effective in slightly increasing voter turnout. Facebook’s US-based
experimentation on the format of the nudge finds that it is most
effective when this voting message includes not just information
reminding the user to vote, but also a “social message” with the
profile pictures of up to six randomly selected Facebook friends
who had clicked the “I voted” button; furthermore, suchmessages
from “close” friends on Facebook were by far the most effective
(Bond et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2017).
Nudging has been critiqued by scholars of public policy
for various reasons (including lack of long-term effectiveness),
but most relevant are critiques based on the ethical concern
that nudging precludes reflection and deliberation by target
individuals about the pros and cons of alternative courses of
action (Hausman and Welch, 2010). Indeed, “nudges” are often
covert attempts to trick citizens into certain behaviours. Under
that reading, nudging is an “inherently elitist choice-limiting
technique” used to achieve what those in positions of power
and authority (Facebook, politicians, policy makers, and experts)
consider “positive public good outcomes” (Mols et al., 2015, p.
87, emphasis added). Regardless of whether or not the outcome
of the nudge is pro-social and desirable, such preclusion of
reflection and deliberation, and limiting people’s choices in order
to change their behaviour, is coercive. Who wields this power,
and to what ends, must therefore be carefully circumscribed.
For instance, while Facebook’s nudging experiments on its
users appear to mobilise more voters, there are questions
as to whether Facebook’s get-out-the-vote button has unduly
influenced elections. After all, there was no prior notification,
and hence public discussion, that this button would appear on
election day; different users are shown different versions of the
message (dependent on message optimisation as well as which
experimental group they are assigned to); not all voters are
on Facebook, while Facebook users in certain electoral districts
might disproportionately favour one party over another; and in
all countries except the USA, Facebook is a foreign power and
legally should not be interfering in their elections (Grassegger,
2018).
Studies from propaganda and policy making agree, then,
that persuasive communication lapses into influence and
manipulation when deception and coercion (via threats, via
limiting people’s choices, and via preclusion of reflection and
deliberation) prevail. This results in the opinions, decisions
or behaviours of target audiences being uninformed and not
freely chosen. While governments argue that such actions are
sometimes in the national interest and produce positive public
good outcomes (ranging from less insurgency to better public
services), such stances are less defensible when it comes to
political campaigning, which ultimately represents a bid for
power. When campaigning for votes, deploying deception and
coercion and encouraging lack of reflection, and deliberation are
inimical to voters freely making informed decisions about who
should govern.
Political Campaigns Meet Digital Marketing
Tools: The Rise of Influence Activities
Political campaigners increasingly deploy digital marketing tools
that lend themselves toward influence activities, and which
have, in some cases, been demonstrably used for deceptive and
coercive purposes. Across the past decade, digital marketing
techniques have progressively supplemented the traditional focus
of political campaigning on demographic market segmentation,
opinion polling, targeted campaigning, and direct marketing.
Increasingly, this involves a move to big data analytics to
provide automated insights using data mining techniques and
tools to discover hidden patterns in datasets. Drawing on a
complex and opaque corporate ecosystem encompassing data
brokers and data analytics companies, political campaigns now
combine public voter files with commercial information from
data brokers to develop highly granular and comprehensive
voter profiles (Bartlett et al., 2018; Nadler et al., 2018; Privacy
International, 2020). This has enabled the rise of influence
activities in digital political campaigning via the use of digital
marketing tools to identify and deploy the most persuasive
advert online, and to target different audiences online with
tailored messages.
For instance, “A/B” testing compares two versions of a single
variable, typically by testing a subject’s response to variant A
against variant B and determining which of the two variants
is more effective. While an old technique, there has been an
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exponential increase in deployment of rapid “A/B” testing using
Artificial Intelligence (AI) across the past decade. The 2012
Barack Obama presidential campaign ran 500 A/B tests on their
web pages which reportedly increased donation conversion by
29% and sign up conversions by 161% (Formisimo, 2016). By
the 2016 presidential election, Trump’s digital campaignmanager
claims that his team tested typically around 50,000–60,000 advert
variations a day using Facebook’s tool, Dynamic Creative, to find
optimal combinations based on engagement metrics (Beckett,
2017; Bartlett et al., 2018, p. 33).
Other digital marketing tools deployed by political
campaigners include psychographic and neuromarketing
tools combined with data and tracking methods (such as
emotion-based profiling) to optimise the emotional impact of
advertising messages to specific audiences’ psychological needs
(Chester andMontgomery, 2017; Kim et al., 2018; McStay, 2018).
Psychographics, emotional testing and mood measurement have
long been central to political campaigns (Key, 1974; Jamieson,
1996), but the rise of big data analysis and modelling has enabled
access to psychological characteristics and political inferences
far beyond the reach of traditional databases (Tufekci, 2014).
For instance, Kosinski et al. (2013) developed an algorithm that,
based on an individual’s “likes” of public Facebook pages (a
fraction of data available to data brokers), could automatically
and accurately predict an individual’s personality traits according
to the “OCEAN” scale. OCEAN is the generally accepted model
of personality: its “Big Five” personality traits are Openness to
experiences, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness,
and Neuroticism (McCrae and Costa, 1987; Gosling et al., 2003).
The algorithm developed by Kosinski et al. (2013) also predicts
other highly sensitive personal attributes including political
and religious views, sexual orientation, ethnicity, intelligence,
happiness, use of addictive substances, parental separation,
age, and gender. Indeed, an increasing body of research in
this young field confirms that digital footprints can be used to
predict the “Big Five” personality traits. This was reaffirmed
in 2018 by a rigorous, multidisciplinary, meta-analysis of the
predictive power of digital footprints automatically collected
from social media over Big Five personality traits (Azucar
et al., 2018, p. 157). The meta-analysis also shows that with
the exception of agreeableness, prediction accuracy for each
trait was stronger when more than one type of digital footprint
was analysed. Caution should be applied to the conclusions
of Azucar et al. (2018) as their meta-analysis analyses just 16
studies, and most of these are limited to English speaking or
Chinese users. Nonetheless, such findings point to the capacity
for covert behaviour change campaigns by those with access
to multiple data streams by profiling individuals, and tailoring
adverts automatically displayed in individual users’ profiles based
on personality. Indeed, it was research such as that by Kosinski
et al. (2013) that attracted the attention of Cambridge Analytica
(Federal Trade Commission, 2019b, p. 3).
Digital marketing tools are also used to find and target
specific voters. For instance, political digital marketing firms
offer “lookalike modelling” to identify potential supporters, by
matching millions of voters to their email addresses, online
cookies and social media handles, as well as hundreds of
other data points (such as culture, religion, interests, and
political positions) to create detailed voter profiles. Notably, Brad
Parscale, digital director of Trump’s 2016 US presidential election
campaign, used Facebook’s advertising platform to automatically
expand the number of people the campaign could target on
Facebook by identifying voters who were not Trump supporters,
but had “common qualities” that “look like” known Trump
supporters on Facebook (Green and Issenberg, 2016). Similarly,
since 2015UKdigital campaigning has seen increasing use of data
analytics and data management approaches in order to profile
and identify target audiences, including “persuadables” and swing
voters (The Electoral Commission, 2018, p. 4). Behavioural data
is also used by politicians to target voters with tailored messages
that align with their daily activities, such as hearing a radio
advert about education when dropping off one’s child at school
(Kaiser, 2019b, p. 82). According to Kaiser, Cambridge Analytica
trademarked the term “behavioural microtargeting” to describe
its practice of using analytic tools to understand individuals’
complex personalities; using psychologists to determine what
motivates these individuals to act; and using a creative team to
tailor specific messages to those personality types (Kaiser, 2019b,
p. 84).
While such efforts could be democratically lauded for
increasing voter engagement and turnout, and making political
campaigners more responsive to what voters care about, digital
political marketing tools are also used for deceptive and
coercive ends. Of course, deception is a long-observed tactic
deployed during election campaigns in democracies (Herbst,
2016; Perloff, 2018). However, by the second decade of the
twenty-first century, deceptive manipulation of the digital media
ecology was increasingly evidenced, to the point where it
could be considered coercive. For instance, in 2010, software
“bots” on Twitter were used in “astroturf” campaigns (where
campaigners try to create the perception of an upswell of
grassroots support for a cause): in US midterm elections
and the Massachusetts special election, they artificially inflated
support for a political candidate and smeared opponents via
thousands of tweets pointing to fake news websites (Ratkiewicz
et al., 2011; Metaxas and Mustafaraj, 2012). The amplification
of low-credibility sources by bots is demonstrated by Shao
et al. (2017) in a study of 14 million messages spreading
400,000 articles on Twitter during and following the 2016
US presidential campaign. That election also saw increased
micro-targeting of messages via social media platforms, often
propagating through anonymous accounts deceptive, divisive or
inflammatory messages most likely to influence votes in marginal
constituencies (US Intelligence Community Assessment, 2017;
Bakir and McStay, 2018; Kim et al., 2018). Indeed, according to
investigative journalists, Cambridge Analytica supplied Trump’s
2016 presidential campaign with statistical models to isolate
likely supporters to then be targeted with adverts on Facebook.
Furthermore, through micro-targeting, in the final days of the
2016 campaign, Trump’s team tried to suppress turnout among
three groups that Hillary Clinton needed to win overwhelmingly:
idealistic white liberals, young women, and African Americans
(Green and Issenberg, 2016; Kaiser, 2019b, p. 84, 222, 228–
229; Wylie, 2019, p, 17). Such manipulation of the digital
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media ecology is coercive (choice limiting) where it significantly
modulates what information people are exposed to, in order to
make them feel or behave in a certain way.
Democratic Implications of Digital
Deception, Coercion, and Influence
Activities
The previous sections show that influence activities involving
deception and coercion are increasingly mainstream in digital
political campaigning. Psychographic profiling is also part of
the mix, with claims for accurate prediction of personality
with big data, and the potential for even greater profiling
and optimisation of political adverts. Against this, there is
scepticism about Cambridge Analytica’s claims and the novelty
of its targeting approach (González, 2017, p. 10–11). As with all
“media effects” research, the impact of such strategies is difficult
to quantify (Aral and Eckles, 2019), but efforts to establish
causal links between these strategies and voting behaviour have
so far concluded that impacts are minimal (Marchal, 2020).
Nonetheless, several empirical research strands allow reflection
on the wider democratic implications of digital influence
activities involving deception and coercion.
One such empirical research strand is on algorithmic filter
bubbles, where algorithms applied to online content selectively
gauge what information a user wants to see based on information
about the user and their digital footprints (Pariser, 2011).
For instance, various studies show that rather than spreading
indiscriminately through social media, conspiracies online are
concentrated within the communities who already agree with
them (Douglas et al., 2019, p. 15). Computational approaches
empirically demonstrate that the consequences of algorithmically
created filter bubbles are limited exposure to, and lack of
engagement with, different ideas, and other people’s viewpoints
(Bessi et al., 2016; Zollo et al., 2017). Filter bubbles make it likely
that micro-targeting of political campaign messages results in the
wider population and mainstream media being left unaware of
the campaigner’s micro-targeted messaging: this makes it difficult
to offer factual correctives to misinformation and disinformation
circulating in filter bubbles.
Another useful empirical research strand is on the impact
of digital deception (encompassing fake news, disinformation,
misinformation, and conspiracies). Vosoughi et al. (2018) find
that false political news diffuses significantly farther, faster,
deeper, and more broadly than the truth on Twitter, and that this
is down to humans (rather than bots) spreading the false news.
A study by Guess et al. (2019) of individual-level characteristics
associated with sharing fake news articles on Facebook during
the 2016 US presidential campaign finds that while sharing
fake news was rare, users over 65 shared nearly seven times
as many articles from fake news domains as the youngest age
group (even after controlling for partisanship and ideology).
Various computational studies empirically point to problems
in correcting false information circulating in algorithmically
created filter bubbles. For instance, a study by Bessi et al. (2016)
examining information consumption patterns of 1.2 million
Italian Facebook users find that those with a polarisation toward
conspiracy are most inclined to spread unverified rumours.
Other studies show that dissenting information is mainly ignored
or may even increase group polarisation (Zollo et al., 2017).
The injection of deceptive political messages into the digital
media ecology by political campaigners is therefore of democratic
concern in that deception spreads faster than the truth; in
misleading certain groups of citizens (older people and those prone
to conspiracy theories); and in its resistance to being corrected.
Indeed, by 2018, Nadler et al. (2018, p. 4–5) identified
a “digital influence machine” consisting of technologies for
surveillance, targeting, testing, and automated decision-making
designed to make advertising more powerful and efficient. They
argue that political and anti-democratic actors weaponise the
digital influence machine by targeting selected audiences when
they are most vulnerable to manipulation through three main
strategies: mobilising supporters via identity threats; dividing
an opponent’s coalition; and leveraging influence techniques
informed by behavioural science. They further argue that rather
than attempting to change people’s beliefs, such weaponised
campaigns aim to amplify existing resentments and anxieties,
raise the emotional stakes of particular issues, stir distrust among
potential coalition partners, and subtly influence decisions about
political behaviours (such as whether to vote) (also see Kim
et al., 2018). As Nadler et al. (2018) point out, combining
psychological research and data-driven targeting to identify
audience’s vulnerabilities is the mainstay of digital marketers,
rather than an outlying technique undertaken only by rogue
organisations. The proliferation of such techniques, whether or
not ultimately influential on voting behaviour, is democratically
problematic. As Marchal (2020) argues, being on the receiving end
of psy-ops and microtargeted ads geared towards voter suppression
might well affect one’s sense of electoral fairness, and potentially
undermine belief in the integrity of electoral processes.
With the negative implications for democracy in mind, the
following sections examine the deceptive and coercive nature
of Cambridge Analytica’s psychographic profiling and targeting
across the UK’s 2016 Brexit Referendum campaign.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
A Case Study Approach
Through qualitative analysis, this paper aims to identify and
understand key important features (deception, coercion, and
influence activities) of a little understood area of digital political
campaigning, while preserving their texture and detail. It adopts
a case study approach, as it seeks to understand in depth,
holistically, and in an exploratory fashion, a contemporary, real-
world phenomenon (Gerring, 2018). This approach excels in
maximising context and in making sense of contradictory details
from multiple sources: these are ideal attributes for unravelling
deceptive and secretive influence activities. This is an important
case study because (a) Cambridge Analytica appears to have
pioneered the application of psy-ops from the military wing to
the political wing of the wider corporate structure within which
it was embedded; (b) its practices have been extensively described
by whistleblowers, and have been investigated by journalists,
public inquiries, and regulators, thereby providing considerable
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insight into normally hidden parts of the digital campaigning
ecosystem; and (c) it enables reflection on the social acceptability
of such techniques.
However, this is a difficult case study to examine empirically
given lack of access to those producing the campaign messages,
to the messages themselves, and to the target audience. Access
to Cambridge Analytica staff for interviews is problematic given
the company’s collapse; staff non-disclosure agreements; and
attempted prosecutions of key figures within the company by the
UK Information Commissioners Office (over Brexit data misuse)
(Information Commissioners Office, 2018); and by the US
Federal Trade Commission (for deceptive harvesting of Facebook
users’ personal information) (Federal Trade Commission,
2019b). Meanwhile, journalists attempting to examine Leave.EU’s
campaign activities have been faced with chilling lawsuits from its
founder and financier, Arron Banks (Bowcott, 2020). The digital
campaign messages that Leave.EU produced are not publicly
archived, as the Brexit referendum predates the political digital
advertising archives since established by social media platforms.
Audience research into their exposure to, and influence from,
Leave.EU campaign messages is difficult because of lack of
public records on who was targeted. Even if audience access was
achievable, the targeted messages did not bear any campaign
imprints, and hence audiences would not necessarily know that
they were receiving political campaign messages; and with such
ephemeral social media messages, recall of exposure is also likely
to be unreliable. Given these impediments, this study relies on
documents already in the public sphere.
Fortunately, there is extensive documentation (thousands
of pages) from public inquiries, regulatory investigations, legal
proceedings, and investigative journalists, as well as public
revelations from Cambridge Analytica and UK Independence
Party (UKIP, a hard Eurosceptic, right-wing UK political party).
Specifically, this paper draws upon the UK Parliament’s Digital,
Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) Committee Inquiry into
Fake News and Disinformation [a lengthy investigation (2017–
2019) that attracted 170 written submissions, conducted 23 oral
evidence sessions, took evidence from 73 witnesses, and asked
over 4,350 questions at hearings]; regulatory investigations by
The Electoral Commission (that regulates UK election spending)
and the Information Commissioners Office [that regulates UK
data protection, with this regulatory body noting that this was
“the most complex data protection investigation we have ever
conducted” (Information Commissioners Office, 2018, p. 15)];
legal proceedings by the US Federal Trade Commission against
Cambridge Analytica; and books and stories by political and
investigative journalists in the UK (Carol Cadwalladr; Channel
4 News; Sunday Times political editor, Tim Shipman) and
USA (Wendy Siegelman, Joshua Green, Sasha Issenberg). It
also draws on public or since-publicised private statements
(in books and interviews) from political actors in the UK
with links to Cambridge Analytica, especially Andy Wigmore
(Director of Communications for Leave.EU during the 2016
EU Referendum) and Arron Banks (political campaign financier
and founder for Leave.EU). Also relevant are statements from
whistleblowers fromUKIP (DanDennemarck, former UKIP data
controller; David Soutter, former UKIP head of candidates).
Finally, it draws on revelations from Cambridge Analytica itself
(promotional literature; public statements from Chief Executive
Officer, Alexander Nix); and material from whistleblowers, Chris
Wylie (contractor at SCL Group and Cambridge Analytica 2013–
14) and Brittany Kaiser (Director of Business Development,
Cambridge Analytica, 2015–18).
These materials are read critically, alert to the possibility
that accounts from individuals may be self-serving and omit
uncomfortable facts. Statements from Cambridge Analytica
and its Chief Executive Officer, Alexander Nix are particularly
suspect: Cambridge Analytica is well-known within the industry
for its sophisticated public relations strategy and relentless self-
promotion (González, 2017). Similarly, Wigmore maintains that
a statement he had made that Cambridge Analytica provided
initial help and guidance to the Leave.EU campaign was
deceptive: he told the Inquiry into FakeNews andDisinformation
that on this matter he was an “agent provocateur” and hadmerely
provided boastful “spin” to get attention from journalists for
the Leave.EU campaign, which had been necessary as he was a
political outsider (Banks and Wigmore, 2018, p. 12).
Positioning the statements and actions of Cambridge
Analytica and Leave.EU within this multi-perspectival archive
helps parse their sometimes contradictory public statements, and
sheds light on secretive influence activities involving deception
and coercion in digital political campaigning efforts during the
2016 Brexit referendum.
RESULTS
The Rise and Fall of Cambridge Analytica
Cambridge Analytica and its various parent companies had
a complex corporate structure. The company was operational
in the UK across 2015–18 (as Cambridge Analytica UK Ltd.)
and in the US (as Cambridge Analytica LLC operational from
2013, with other variations operational from 2014 and 2015).
Since June 2016, Cambridge Analytica UK was owned by
political consultancy SCL Elections Ltd., which also had several
US affiliate companies. SCL Group Limited was the parent
company of Cambridge Analytica UK Ltd. and SCL Elections
Ltd (Siegelman, 2017; Kaiser, 2019b; UK High Court Judgement,
2019) (see Figure 1).
SCL Elections deployed psy-ops in more than 200 elections
around the world, mostly in undeveloped democracies (Channel
4 News, 2018; DCMS, 2018, chapter 6; Kaiser, 2019b, chapter
3; Wylie, 2019, p. 134–135, 166; Briant, 2020). According to
Cambridge Analytica whistleblower Brittany Kaiser, rather than
engaging in blanket political advertising to persuade voters, “to
get people to act, you created the conditions under which they
would be more likely to do what you wanted them to do” (Kaiser,
2019b, p. 49). SCL Elections’ parent company, SCL Group
Limited, also operated in the defence sector, for instance, owning
SCL Strategic Limited [formerly, SCL Defence Ltd Siegelman
(2017)] where it, too, deployed psy-ops (Tatham, 2015; Wylie,
2018a, 2019, p. 39–57) (see Figure 1). Kaiser (2019b, p. 32)
describes an SCL brochure proclaiming how it “used ‘psy-ops’
in defense and humanitarian campaigns.” As Wylie, describes in
evidence to the Inquiry into Fake News and Disinformation:
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FIGURE 1 | Corporate structure of SCL Group Ltd and subsidiaries.
Cambridge Analytica (“CA”) was created by SCL Group with
funding from Robert Mercer, an American billionaire . . . Mercer
wanted to use the IO [Information Operations] tactics SCL had
used onmilitary projects for his political aims in theUnited States,
and elsewhere, including the United Kingdom. CA’s focus was
to adapt these strategies for politics, as well as research ways to
modernise and deploy IO approaches in online social networks
(Wylie, 2018a, p. 8).
It was the deceptive data-gathering that underpinned such
Information Operations activities that led to Cambridge
Analytica’s collapse. Cambridge Analytica and its parent
companies, SCL Elections and SCL Group went into
administration in May 2018, after two events that raised
public disquiet. The first event was public allegations made by
Wylie that Cambridge Analytica had exploited personal data of
Facebook users (Wylie, 2018b, p. 14): this contradicted evidence
given to the Inquiry into Fake News and Disinformation by
Cambridge Analytica’s Chief Executive Officer, Alexander Nix
(Nix, 2018a, p. 24–25, Nix, 2018b, p. 15, p. 18). The second
event was Nix being caught on tape in an undercover story for
Channel 4 News broadcast on 20 March 2018, bragging about
using bribery, sexual “honey traps” and manipulation of social
media on behalf of clients to influence elections around the
world (Channel 4 News, 2018; DCMS, 2018).
Following its collapse, Cambridge Analytica was found to have
breached principle one of the UK’s Data Protection Act 1998 for
unfairly processing people’s personal data for political purposes,
including purposes connected with the 2016 US Presidential
campaigns. The breaches were so serious that by November
2018, the UK’s data regulator, the Information Commissioners’
Office, stated that it would have issued a “substantial fine” had
the company not already gone into administration (Information
Commissioners Office, 2018, p. 35).
The following year, in July 2019, as well as levying a
record $5 billion civil penalty against Facebook for failing to
protect users’ privacy, the US Federal Trade Commission filed
an administrative complaint against Cambridge Analytica LLC
(the US arm) for deceptive harvesting of personal information
from tens of millions of Facebook users for voter profiling and
targeting. This personal information had been collected in 2014
from users of a Facebook app (the “GSRApp”); it had exploited
Facebook’s now notorious (and since 2015, ended) data portal
(“Friends API”) that enabled the app developer to share not
only users’ data but that of all their friends. The information
comprised users’ Facebook User ID, which connects individuals
to their Facebook profiles, as well as other personal information
such as their gender, birthdate, location, and Facebook friends
list (Federal Trade Commission, 2019a; Wylie, 2019, p. 112–132).
In April 2018, Facebook revealed that the maximum number
of unique accounts that directly installed the GSRApp, as well
as those whose data may have been shared with the app by
their friends, comprised 70,632,350 in the USA, 1,175,870 in the
Philippines, 1,096,666 in Indonesia, 1,079,031 in the UK, 789,880
inMexico, 622,161 in Canada, 562,455 in India, 443,117 in Brazil,
427,446 in Vietnam, and 311,127 in Australia (Schroepfer, 2018).
This personal data had been collected deceptively: GSRApp
users had been told that the app would not download identifiable
information. The GSRApp asked its users to answer personality
and other questions that Cambridge Analytica used to train
an algorithm that generated personality scores for the app
users and their Facebook friends. Cambridge Analytica, Nix,
and the app’s developer (Aleksandr Kogan) then matched these
personality scores with US voter records. Cambridge Analytica
used these matched personality scores for its voter profiling
and targeted advertising services (Federal Trade Commission,
2019a). According to Kaiser, Cambridge Analytica’s “prodigious
and unprecedented” database (Kaiser, 2019b, p. 77) included data
from Facebook, data vendors, and (in the USA) their client’s
proprietary data that they had produced themselves and was not
purchasable on the open market: as such, Cambridge Analytica
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held between 2,000 and 5,000 individual pieces of personal
information on every person in the USA over the age of 18 years
(Kaiser, 2019b, p. 12–13, 78, 82–83).
There are coercive elements to how this deceptively gathered
data was then deployed. Speaking to the US context, Cambridge
Analytica whistleblower, Christopher Wylie, testified about the
company to the US Congress and the UK Parliament’s Inquiry
into Fake News and Disinformation (Wylie, 2019). He describes
how, across 2014, using its massive trove of data, Cambridge
Analytica had worked to develop detailed “psychographic
profiles” for every US voter, and experimented with ways to stoke
paranoia and bigotry by exploiting certain personality traits: In
one exercise, Cambridge Analytica asked subjects whether they
would approve of their daughter marrying a Mexican immigrant:
those who denied discomfort with the idea were asked a follow-
up question designed to provoke irritation at the constraints of
political correctness: “Did you feel like you had to say that?”
(Wylie, 2019, p. 129). As Wylie told the Inquiry into Fake News
and Disinformation:
If you can create a psychological profile of a type of person who
is more prone to adopting certain forms of ideas, conspiracies
for example, and you can identify what that person looks like in
data terms, you can then go out and predict how likely somebody
is going to be to adopt more conspiratorial messaging and then
advertise or target them with blogs or websites or what everyone
now calls fake news, so that they start seeing all of these ideas or all
of these stories around them in their digital environment (Wylie,
2018b, p. 21–22).
Wylie claims that people who exhibited certain psychological
characteristics could be “nudged” into more extreme beliefs and
conspiratorial thinking. Psychological research on conspiracies
agrees that conspiracy theories may influence people’s attitudes,
with the level of influence appearing to depend on pre-existing
attitudes and possibly other unknown factors (Douglas et al.,
2019, p. 18). Some psychological studies also find that exposure
to anti-government conspiracy theories lowers intention to
vote and decreases political trust among UK and US citizens
(although in other countries, it increases intention to engage in
political action) (Kim and Cao, 2016; Douglas et al., 2019, p.
20). Regardless of its actual impact, what Wylie is describing
amounts to coercive (choice limiting) attempted manipulation
of potential voters by psychologically profiling them in order to
target them with a provocative morass of digital disinformation
and significantly alter what they are exposed to in the digital
media ecology. The question that this paper now turns to is
whether such coercive and deceptive practices were deployed by
Cambridge Analytica in the UK’s Brexit Referendum.
The Brexit Referendum: Targeted,
Coercive, and Deceptive Digital
Campaigning
On 23 June 2016, UK Prime Minister David Cameron fulfilled
an election pledge to hold a national referendum on whether
or not the UK should remain in the EU or leave (the Brexit
Referendum). The Leave campaign narrowly won: 51.9% voted
to Leave, 48.1% voted to Remain. The “Remain” campaign had
urged the British people to vote to stay in the EU, the prime
benefits being a stronger economy. “Leavers” promoted the
benefits of lowering immigration, reducing the risk of terrorism
and regaining control over the national economy (Goodwin,
2018). The referendum generated strongly held “Brexit” identities
that prevailed even several years later, with affective polarisation
as intense as that of partisanship in terms of stereotyping and
prejudice (Hobolt, 2018; Hobolt et al., 2018). The Leave and
Remain referendum campaigns were replete with misuse of
statistics and false information from both sides, as evidenced by
The Telegraph and fact-checker Full Fact (Kirk, 2017). However,
the Leave campaigns were particularly noteworthy for high levels
of targeted deception. “Vote Leave” was the official campaign to
leave the EU, led by Conservative Members of Parliament, Boris
Johnson, and Michael Gove. There were also various unofficial
Leave campaigns, including the Leave.EU group founded by
Arron Banks and Richard Tice. This paper focuses on the
Leave.EU group’s campaign because, as demonstrated below,
it was characterised by audience profiling and targeting that
resulted in propagation of deceptive messages using coercive
tools: at the heart of this was Cambridge Analytica.
Leave.EU’s Secret Audience Profiling and Targeting
During the Brexit referendum, Leave.EU did not declare any
expenditure on Cambridge Analytica, or any in-kind donations
(these would have to be declared to the UK’s Electoral
Commission, which enforces election laws and spending limits).
In his initial letter and in oral evidence to the Inquiry into
Fake News and Disinformation in February 2018, Nix states that
“Cambridge Analytica had no involvement in the referendum,
was not retained by any campaign, and did not provide any
services (paid or unpaid) to any campaign” (Nix, 2018b, p. 2,
Nix, 2018c). However, across the ensuing months, Arron Banks
(Leave.EU founder and financier) submitted evidence to the
Inquiry that showed that Cambridge Analytica had prepared
a detailed pitch to Leave.EU to choose their company to help
make the case to the Electoral Commission that Leave.EU
should become the official campaign group for Leave (Cambridge
Analytica/SCL Group, 2015a). Banks maintains that although
Cambridge Analytica made a pitch, Leave.EU did not go forward
with the work (Banks, 2018a,b; Banks and Wigmore, 2018, p. 4).
Banks does reveal, however, that “some UKIP data” was sent to
Cambridge Analytica to do “some initial scoping work” which
resulted in a large bill to UKIP; and that UKIP approached Banks
to pay it, but that Banks refused (Banks and Wigmore, 2018,
p. 10).
Contradicting these claims that no work was done for
Leave.EU, whistleblower Britanny Kaiser submitted evidence to
the Inquiry in April 2018, that Cambridge Analytica was initially
engaged with Banks, Wigmore and Matthew Richardson (former
UKIP party secretary) to design parallel proposals for Leave.EU,
GoSkippy/Eldon Insurance (Banks’ insurance companies) and
UKIP. Kaiser raised concerns that the personal data of British
citizens who merely wanted to buy insurance was being used for
political purposes (Kaiser, 2018b, p. 3) and expressed “similar
concerns about whether UKIP members consented to the use
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of their data” (Kaiser, 2018b, p. 2, 2019b, p. 138). Over a year
later, in July 2019, Kaiser, supplied ten documents dated from
2015 to the Inquiry that showed that Cambridge Analytica had
engaged in some work for Leave.EU on the EU referendum. This
included analysis of UKIP’s membership data (whose members
are hard Eurosceptics), and analysis of survey results, to model
four key groups of persuadable British voters to target with
Leave.EU messaging: the “Eager Activist,” “Young Reformers,”
“Disaffected Tories,” and “Left Behinds” (Kaiser, 2019a, p. 51–
52). In December 2019, whistleblower Dan Dennemarck, UKIP’s
former data controller, claimed that he had been ordered to
hand over UKIP’s database of over 100,000 current and ex-
members to staff of Leave.EU during the referendum. David
Soutter, UKIP’s former head of candidates, also claims that a deal
had been made as UKIP had faced financial meltdown following
its unsuccessful election battle against the Conservatives in 2015:
“UKIP was financially on the ropes. It was short of money. I
understood at the time that an offer had been made by Arron
Banks to take on that weight, to take on that role, and run
the database. Run the membership function of UKIP” (Howker,
2019).
Whether or not chargeable work was done by Cambridge
Analytica for Leave.EU, evidence suggests that Leave.EU
greatly benefited from the work that went into Cambridge
Analytica’s pitch. The evidence indicates that actuaries from
Banks’ insurance company (Eldon Insurance) copied Cambridge
Analytica’s modelling to identify 12 areas in the UK that were
most concerned about the EU, in order to target them with
in-person visits from Nigel Farage (then leader of UKIP).
This was revealed by Andy Wigmore when interviewed by
propaganda scholar, Emma Briant on 4 October 2017 (her
interview later submitted as evidence to the Inquiry into
Fake News and Disinformation) (Briant, 2018, p. 4–5). When
questioned by the Inquiry on this point, Wigmore accuses
Briant of misinterpreting his interview (Banks and Wigmore,
2018, p. 33). Nonetheless, Leave.EU saw Farage as vital to
turning out voters who had never voted before but were
passionate about leaving the EU because of how immigration
affected their lives (Banks, 2017, p. 309; Shipman, 2017,
p. 412).
There are at least two ways, then, in which Leave.EU may
have used the UKIP database (that, according to whistleblowers,
Banks had purchased) to find other pro-Brexit voters via social
media platforms: by using tools from social media platforms such
as Facebook’s Lookalike audience builder (as described earlier);
and/or by copying Cambridge Analytica’s modelling using Banks’
actuaries from his insurance company. Such data and insights
would complement activities by the US strategy firm (Goddard
Gunster) hired by Leave.EU to engage in large scale telephone
polling (between 25,000 and 100,000 people) to understand
voters’ concerns, followed by population segmentation, micro-
targeting identified groups, and then getting the vote out via
“precision target-messaging” (Banks, 2017, p. 309; Shipman,
2017, p. 412–413).
Such opacity regarding the use made of Cambridge Analytica’s
work for Leave.EU raises as yet unanswered questions about
what datasets were used to enable political profiling of the
British population. Beyond this, even murkier aspects of
Leave.EU’s targeting techniques also emerged, revealing coercive
and deceptive features of Cambridge Analytica’s psychographic
profiling and targeting.
Coercive Features of Leave.EU’s Campaign
Cambridge Analytica’s psychographic profiling tool had military
origins. As described earlier, SCL Group operated a political
arm (SCL Elections/Cambridge Analytica) and a defence arm,
both of which deployed psy-ops tools. One such tool is Target
Audience Analysis, a core methodology utilised by Strategic
Communications Laboratories Group (which until June 2015
was the name of SCL Group Limited). A North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) Joint Warfare Centre publication (written
in 2015 by a psy-ops specialist) describes Target Audience
Analysis as a military psy-ops tool used to identify and influence
influential target audiences in order to change their behaviour,
and to model different interventions in this desired behaviour
change. The article notes that the Target Audience Analysis
methodology was soon to be used in a purpose-built NATO
“Train the Trainer” Programme developed and delivered by
Strategic Communications Laboratories Group and Information
Operations Training and Advisory (IOTA) Services Global
(Tatham, 2015, p. 51): IOTA Global Ltd. was owned by Nigel
Oakes and Alexander Oakes, who both also had shares in,
and were directors of, Strategic Communications Laboratories
Group/SCL Group Limited (Siegelman, 2017). Strategic
Communications Laboratories Group had spent over $40
million and 25 years, developing this group behaviour prediction
tool. Its methodology: “builds up a detailed understanding of
current behaviour, values, attitudes, beliefs and norms, and
examines everything from whether a group feels in control
of its life, to who they respect, and what radio stations they
listen to. TAA can be undertaken covertly” (Tatham, 2015, p. 51,
emphasis added).
Notably, the Target Audience Analysis methodology was an
integral part of the pitch that Cambridge Analytica made to
Leave.EU to help their campaign be selected as the official
Leave campaign by the Electoral Commission (and that Banks
maintains was never progressed) (Cambridge Analytica/SCL
Group, 2015a,b). A Cambridge Analytica document detailing the
pitch states:
The first part of this phase, which will be centred on a particular
geographic area (like a parliamentary constituency), will involve
a programme of Target Audience Analysis, whereby qualitative
and quantitative research is conducted in order to segment
the population into target audiences according to their views,
motivations and interests.
The second part of Phase II, Political Microtargeting, involves the
use of secondary data sources and advanced analytics to assign
values on particular traits to the entire voting population of the
area in question. This will allow for the target audiences to be
resegmented and contacted as required over the course of the
campaign, and the use of this data will be facilitated by the
deployment of an online database utility created by Cambridge
Anlaytica for Leave.EU
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. . . The end result of this process is a comprehensive plan for
influencing voters likely to be receptive to Leave.EU’s positions
and messages (Cambridge Analytica/SCL Group, 2015a, p. 7).
The pitch claims that its “powerful predictive analytics and
campaign messaging capacity can help you to segment
and message the population according to a range of
criteria.” As well as including “Psychographic clusters” and
“Persuadability,” another of these criteria is “Partisanship.”
As well as describing the “General Voter” and “Ideological
Voter,” this criterion describes the “Opposition Voter—groups
to dissuade from political engagement or to remove from
contact strategy altogether” (Cambridge Analytica/SCL Group,
2015a, p. 3, emphasis added). Part of this pitch, then, offered
voter suppression.
Most of the pitch, however, was geared toward highlighting
the individually tailored nature of its micro-targeting,
exploiting what people care about. This would be possible
because, as Kaiser told the Inquiry into Fake News and
Disinformation, the tool that Cambridge Analytica developed
for psychographic micro-targeting in the US used far
more data than that used by Target Audience Analysis
for military psy-ops purposes (as developed by Strategic
Communications Laboratories Group) (Kaiser, 2018a, p. 20–21).
The pitch states:
What this process offers is the opportunity to target communications
at the scale of the individual.
In other words, Leave.EU will be able to ensure that every piece
of digital or print advertising is directed at somebody who cares
about the particular issue, or is likely to respond positively. This
means that your campaign can save money that would otherwise
have been spent contacting voters who are vehemently pro-EU,
and direct those resources into making more frequent contact
with swing voters and supporters you wish to mobilise as donors
or volunteers. (Cambridge Analytica/SCL Group, 2015a, p. 8).
To summarise, Target Audience Analysis is a military-developed
psy-ops tool used to identify and influence influential target
audiences in order to change their behaviour, and to model
different interventions in this desired behaviour change. Such
behaviour change tools are coercive in that they aim to change
people’s behaviour via covert psychological manipulation rather
than through freely chosen, deliberative decisions. Furthermore,
Cambridge Analytica offered its profiling and micro-targeting
services using far more data than that used by the Target
Audience Analysis methodology developed for military psy-ops;
and as noted earlier, a meta-analysis of relevant psychometrics
research (Azucar et al., 2018) points to capacity for covert
behaviour change campaigns by those with access to multiple
data streams. On top of this, when Cambridge Analytica
pitched for Leave.EU’s business, part of that pitch offered
voter suppression—which is coercive in that it actively seeks
to constrain people’s choices in dampening their volition
to vote.
Deceptive Features of Leave.EU’s Campaign
As noted earlier, Cambridge Analytica whistleblower Wylie,
speaking to the US context, describes coercive (choice limiting)
manipulation of potential voters by psychologically profiling
them in order to target them with a provocative morass of
digital disinformation, thereby significantly altering what they
are exposed to in the digital media ecology. If Cambridge
Analytica followed the same playbook in the Brexit referendum
as Wylie claims that it used in the US elections, then it would
also target psychologically profiled referendum voters with a
morass of optimised digital disinformation. The absence of a
complete database of digital ads from the 2016 referendummakes
verification of any such claim difficult (Facebook only released
ads to the Inquiry into Fake News and Disinformation from
the other Leave groups rather than from Leave.EU) (Facebook,
2018). However, we can glean the following about Leave.EU’s
targeted deception.
We know from whistleblower Kaiser that in 2015, Cambridge
Analytica had modelled four key groups of persuadable British
voters to target with Leave.EU messaging, one of which was the
“Left Behinds” (Kaiser, 2019a, p. 51–52). These are described (in
an email to Kaiser dated 16 November 2015) as follows:
Left Behinds. . .
- Feels increasingly left behind by society and globalisation
- Unhappy with the economy and the NHS, but immigration is
most important issue
- Suspicious of the establishment including politicians banks
and corporations
- Worried about their economic security, deteriorating public
order and the future generally (Kaiser, 2019a, p. 51–52,
emphasis added).
In her book, Kaiser states that if OCEAN personality trait scoring
had been applied to the “Left Behinds,” they “might have been
found to be highly neurotic and, hence, most reachable when
messaging appealed to their fears” (Kaiser, 2019b, p. 137). Given
this modelling, the fact that net migration to the UK had rapidly
increased since 2013 with the Syrian civil war generating an
additional migrant crisis in 2015 (Shipman, 2017, p. 15, 20), and
the fact that political campaigners have long appealed to identities
and agitated anxieties around identity threats (Albertson
and Gadarian, 2015), it is unsurprising that controlling
immigration became a central message of the various Leave
group campaigns.
Leave.EU emotively enhanced the immigration message
through deceptive and outrageous claims (a strategy that
Leave.EU’s Wigmore copied from Trump). This enabled greater
virality on social media and attracted mainstream press attention
thereby generating free publicity and keeping immigration in
people’s minds (Banks, 2017, p. 282; Chappell, 2017; Shipman,
2017, p. 215, 391). For instance, UKIP’s notorious billboard
advert (that also ran in many northern regional newspapers)
depicted a stream of migrants at the Croatian-Slovenian border,
captioned “Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all” and
“We must break free of the EU and take back control of our
borders” (Shipman, 2017, p. 392). This is comparable to Nazi
propaganda from the 1930s showing lines of Jewish people
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flooding into Europe (Wylie, 2019, p. 167). On social media,
Leave.EU targeted and spread particularly harsh and wholly
deceptive anti-immigration messages, also targeting overt racists
such as supporters of the British National Party and Britain
First (until their strategy was discovered and publicised by
the Remain group) (Shipman, 2017, p. 413). For instance,
after 49 people were murdered in Orlando, Florida in a gay
nightclub by a Muslim with an assault rifle, Leave.EU posted an
advert depicting terrorists waving AK-47s captioned, “Islamist
extremism is a real threat to our way of life. Act now before
we see an Orlando-style atrocity” (Banks, 2017, p. 282). A
typical Leave.EU Facebook post warned voters that “immigration
without assimilation equals invasion” (Caesar, 2019). During the
referendum campaign, Leave.EU also published a fake video as
an “undercover investigation” on Facebook that went viral, with
hundreds of thousands of views. The video claimed to show how
easy it is to smuggle migrants into the UK from across the English
Channel, but debunking this video several years later, satellite
data shows that the footage was filmed in reverse (Channel 4
News, 2019). Such deceptive messages delivered via Facebook
to targeted, profiled audiences would be difficult for the wider
population to discern and counteract.
Public Feeling on Deception and
Micro-Targeting in Digital Political
Campaigning
This paper has discussed scholarship that points to capacity for
covert behaviour change arising from digital campaigns by those
with access to multiple data streams, by profiling individuals,
and tailoring adverts automatically displayed in individual users’
profiles based on personality. It has highlighted how Cambridge
Analytica sought to deploy these techniques in the Leave.EU
campaign, and how the Leave.EU campaign adapted modelling
from Cambridge Analytica’s pitch to engage targeted audiences
with emotive, deceptive ads. Throughout his testimony to the
Inquiry into Fake News and Disinformation, Nix, in defence
of Cambridge Analytica’s mode of operation, maintains that
people are “not naïve” and understand how their data can be
gathered, processed and used to support other campaigns (Nix,
2018b, p. 32). This begs the question, what is public awareness
of, and feeling toward, deceptive micro-targeting for political
campaigning purposes?
A US poll (conducted by Knight Foundation-Gallup across
3–15 December 2019) finds that people do not like deception
in their online political advertising. Specifically, it finds that
large majorities of Americans want social media companies
to ban clearly false content in political ads. For instance, on
adverts targeting supporters of an opposing candidate or cause
and providing the wrong election date, 81% support banning
the adverts; on adverts that say a politician voted for a policy
that they did not actually vote for, 62% support banning the
adverts; but where the false content is less clear cut, (namely,
misrepresenting a candidate’s position on an issue by providing
some accurate facts or details but leaving out others), 45%
support banning the adverts (McCarthy, 2020). This desire for
action against deceptive online political adverts manifests not just
in the USA, but globally. An international survey of digital news
consumption of over 80,000 people across 40 countries finds that
most people (58%) prefer platforms to block political adverts that
could contain inaccurate claims, even if it means that technology
companies ultimately get to decide what is true (Newman et al.,
2020, p. 42) .
Where people are aware of digital micro-targeting practices
being used to attempt to persuade them, most do not like it.
A YouGov survey commissioned by pro-privacy group Open
Rights Group (ORG) in 2019 finds that a majority of the
UK national sample (58%) said they were against targeting
or tailoring adverts during an election based on analysis of
personal data to segment people into groups (ORG, 2020). In
the US, even more people are against micro-targeting through
digital ads. The US poll (conducted by Knight Foundation-
Gallup across 3–15 December 2019) finds that 72% of Americans
say that internet companies should make no information about
its users available to political campaigns in order to target
certain voters with online adverts. Only 20% of US adults favour
allowing campaigns access to limited, broad details about internet
users, such as their gender, age or postal code. This is in line
with Google’s policy, which, in 2019, reined in the scope of
information that political campaigns can use for targeting. Only
7% of Americans say that any information should be made
available for a campaign’s use. This is in line with Facebook’s
targeting policies, which do not put any such limits in place
on advert targeting (although Facebook does give its users
some control over how many adverts they see) (McCarthy,
2020).
Unfortunately, many people do not realise that digital micro-
targeting tools are being employed for political purposes. The
UK’s 2016 Brexit referendum saw “dark ads” (namely, micro-
targeted online adverts only seen by the recipient) being
discussed in public for the first time. Following the referendum,
Dominic Cummings (Vote Leave’s Campaign Director) claimed
that Vote Leave innovated, “the first web-based canvassing
software that actually works properly in the UK and its
integration into world-leading data science modelling to target
digital advertising and ground campaigning” (Cummings, 2017).
Although the accuracy of the profiling undertaken by British
political parties is disputed (Crowe et al., 2020), the use of such
canvassing tools has since become increasingly mainstream in
the UK. For instance, “Nationbuilder” allows campaignmanagers
to build profiles of supporters and activists, integrate that
database with information from social media and electoral rolls,
and organise canvassing according to target voters’ location.
“Ecanvasser” uses voter mapping, surveys, issue tracking and
analytics to understand what voters are thinking in order to
target them through emails (Ecanvasser, 2020). By the UK’s 2019
General Election, just over half of the UK public were aware
of digital micro-targeting tools with a majority disapproving
of these practices: however, there were still large proportions
unaware. YouGov survey research in 2019 commissioned by
ORG shows that although 54% of the UK population were
aware of how political parties target or tailor adverts based
on analysis of their personal data (political microtargeting),
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almost a third (31%) were not aware at all, or not very aware.
Only 44% of the national sample were very or fairly aware of
“dark ads” with a similar figure (41%) not very or at all aware
(ORG, 2020). It is alarming that a significant proportion of the
British electorate are still unaware of how parties may attempt
to manipulate them through digital micro-targeting, given
several years of public discussion and increasing deployment of
these practices.
DISCUSSION
Cambridge Analytica’s profiling offered to the Leave.EU
campaign in the 2016 Brexit Referendum had deceptive and
coercive features. On deception, Cambridge Analytica’s big
data gathering for its psychographic micro-targeting lied to
people about using their personal data, resulting in maximum
permissible fines to both Cambridge Analytica and Facebook
by the UK’s Information Commissioners Office, and attempts
to sue by the US Federal Trade Commission. Cambridge
Analytica’s modelling of UKIP data to generate four key
groups of persuadable British voters to be targeted with
Leave.EU messaging, was not declared to the UK’s Electoral
Commission during the referendum. Finally, Leave.EU created
highly deceptive, Facebook ads and videos propagating harsh
anti-immigration messages.
On coercion, a core psy-ops methodology (Target Audience
Analysis) designed to covertly generate behaviour change in
target populations was developed by the defence arm of SCL
Group; and Target Audience Analysis was deployed by the
political arm of SCL Group for digital political campaigning
purposes. Cambridge Analytica’s Chief Executive Officer,
whistleblowers, and the psychology literature pronounce the
efficacy of psychographic targeting when combined with big
data analysis. Such behaviour change tools are coercive in
intention: they aim to make people change their behaviour
via covert psychological manipulation rather than through
freely chosen, deliberated decisions. Furthermore, when
Cambridge Analytica pitched for Leave.EU’s business, part
of that pitch offered voter suppression—a technique that
it also employed in Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign.
Voter suppression is coercive in that it actively seeks to
constrain people’s choices in dampening their volition to
vote. Finally, that voters were targeted both with deceptive
Facebook posts propagating harsh anti-immigration messages
and with in-person visits from Farage suggests that their
digital filter bubbles and real-world experiences were
manipulated to maximise their exposure to this particular
information stream.
It is well-understood that propaganda often involves
deception, but its coercive elements are less often discussed.
To ethically persuade people to a particular political point of
view demands that the persuadee’s decision should be both
informed and freely chosen (Bakir et al., 2019). If people are
deceived into agreeing with something then their viewpoint is
not informed: rather, they have been manipulated. If people
are coerced into agreeing with something not just via violence
or threats, but via precluding opportunities for reflection and
deliberation and by limiting people’s choices (be this the use
of optimised microtargeting to suppress a target audience’s
desire to vote, or to modulate its exposure to information
that is important in informing voting choices), then their
viewpoint has not been freely arrived at: rather, they have
been manipulated. If micro-targeting means that the wider
population are unaware of the deception and coercion, then
the wider population are also disabled from having reflective
and deliberative shared conversations about what political
campaigners stand for, weakening the opportunity to correct
false and/or emotive information.
To put it more formally, the psy-ops like features of
campaigns using psychographics and big data is evident in that
psychographic targeting exploits (a) the cultural-psychological
attributes of profiled target audiences and (b) the digital mass
communication system (especially social media and databases)
to deliver (c) optimised messages to influence or nudge the target
audience (constituting the application of force in precluding
opportunities for reflection and deliberation and in limiting
peoples’ choices by making them feel or behave in a certain way)
(d) in a covert manner (the target audience is unaware of the
manipulation) that (e) also lends itself to deception (because of
its covert nature).
A limitation of this study is its inability to demonstrate
that deployment of such psy-ops campaigning tactics actually
influenced targeted voters. This, unfortunately, is a general
weakness of media “effects” research on the effectiveness of
such digital political campaigning tactics, given the opacity
and targeted nature of the messages; the absence of an
independent, publicly accessible database of all digital adverts
deployed; the absence of information on who specifically
received these targeted messages, and on what basis, as
well as the extent of organic information diffusion; and the
impossibility of determining which messages proved decisive
in influencing people’s vote (Aral and Eckles, 2019; Marchal,
2020). However, these limitations do not invalidate efforts to
understand attempted psy-ops in digital political campaigns.
Whether or not such tactics work, they evidence sustained
efforts by political campaigners to provide more efficient ways
to influence human behaviour by using opaque data science
methods that, as surveys show, many people are unaware
of and which the majority dislikes. This matters because, as
Marchal (2020) points out, it attacks fundamental democratic
norms and values, such as having fair access to information
about parties and candidates that are free from undue influence
or coercion.
Understanding and combating deception and coercion
practiced via micro-targeting in digital political campaigns
is important. Not just a normative ethical claim, this is
also the view of the majority of the British and American
adult population. This raises the question of whether,
under pressure from regulators and governments, globally
dominant US social media companies have since put in place
adequate measures to eliminate the risk of further psy-ops
activities in digital political campaigning. The core issue is
micro-targeted deception.
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On deception, Twitter’s solution, since October 2019, is
not to accept explicitly political adverts (Glazer, 2019). Google
takes down political adverts that clearly violate its advertising
policies, including “deep fakes” (doctored and manipulated
media), misleading claims about the census process, and adverts
or destinations making demonstrably false claims that could
significantly undermine participation or trust in an electoral or
democratic process (Spencer, 2019). However, such moves by
Twitter and Google do not prevent political actors from inserting
“surreptitious political messaging” into social media streams
(Brown et al., 2020, p. 105). Furthermore, Facebook refuses to
police the internet for political speech. Rather, Facebook’s (and
also Google’s solution), since 2018, is to create a library of social
media election adverts, thereby increasing transparency so that
people can inspect the adverts and make their own evaluations.
These archives show information such as who funded the
advert, a range of how much they spent, and the reach of the
advert across multiple demographics (Facebook, 2020; Google,
2020).
On micro-targeting, in November 2019, Google said
that while it had “never offered granular microtargeting
of election ads,” it was further limiting election adverts’
targeting to the general categories of age, gender and
general location (postal code level), as well as to contextual
targeting (Spencer, 2019); that advertisers would no
longer be able to target political messages based on users’
interests inferred from their browsing or search histories
(Glazer, 2019); and that this approach would be enforced
worldwide form January 2020. However, Facebook continues
to micro-target. Nowhere does its political advert archive
disclose how those adverts were targeted. Also, as Angwin
(2020) reports, Facebook still allows advertisers to use
provocative targeting criterion, such as “interested in
pseudoscience,” thereby demonstrating that grouping users
by their vulnerabilities continues. It is of concern, then, that
a significant proportion of the British electorate are still
unaware of how parties may attempt to manipulate them
through micro-targeting.
Thus, on micro-targeted deception, while some progress has
been made among dominant US social media companies to
reduce this psy-ops feature, Facebook still enables it during
elections. As Facebook has more than 2.45 billion monthly active
users globally, with the majority of users outside the USA or
Canada (Facebook, 2019), micro-targeted deception remains a
significant democratic threat. This threat persists in the UK
where there has been no significant change to electoral law
since 2001 (pre-dating the rise of social media) (Information
Commissioners Office, 2018; All Party Parliamentary Group
on Electoral Campaigning Transparency, 2020). However, the
threat is especially problematic in countries with weaker privacy
and data protections and weaker electoral traditions (Brown
et al., 2020; Privacy International, 2020). For instance, in a
survey of Commonwealth countries, Brown et al. (2020, p.
98) find that, of the 25 countries that responded, by far the
greatest proportion of reported cases of electoral misinformation
on social media platforms is found on Facebook (>90%)
and its service Whatsapp (>40%). Furthermore, this threat is
unlikely to diminish as current practices of usage of big data
analysis, targeted advertising and psychographics are likely to
be intensified as AI further permeates political communications
(Bartlett et al., 2018), while using AI to detect and restrict
deceptive content struggles heavily as such content is value-laden,
subjective and complex (Brown et al., 2020, p. 103).
There is thus a need for continuing scrutiny of this fast-
developing area by interdisciplinary scholarship. In particular,
more research is needed into:
• Technological claims, especially the predictive power of digital
footprints automatically collected from social media over
the Big Five personality traits beyond English speaking or
Chinese users.
• Political practices, especially the routine (and not just rogue)
practices of digital political consultancies, including their use
of psychographics and big data analytics to profile and target
citizens in all countries that operate elections.
• User studies, to examine; (a) to what extent targeted
groups are subjected to choice-limiting coercion during
elections, such as whether they are exposed to a significant
stream of information designed to change their behaviour;
(b) the media literacy, not just of British and American
citizens, but of voters in all countries that operate elections
when faced with attempts to influence them via deceptive
and coercive digital political campaigns; (c) the social
acceptability of micro-targeting for political purposes, and
whether such practices are undermining confidence in
democratic institutions and processes in all countries that
run elections.
Addressing these questions will progress understanding of
the scale and impact of psy-ops activities in digital political
campaigning across the world.
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